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ADDRESS
SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
TO REPAIR UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION*
RUTH BADER GINSBURG**
I. INTRODUCTION
A MONG GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS, the judiciary has been described as
"the least dangerous branch."' Courts in our system have the
awesome power to declare laws unconstitutional, but judges command
no troops, and are said to lack the power of the purse.' My remarks ad-
dress a facet of the purse power supposition: When a legislative product
is constitutionally infirm because it is underinclusive, what remedies lie
within the judicial province? Discussion will focus on the question
whether a court may order inclusion of a category of persons left out by
the legislature, a question particularly pointed when the court's inclu-
sion order would mandate increased government spending.
II. AN ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE
A. A Paradigmatic Case: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld
Judicial enlargement of a statute was the remedy soughtin a series of
cases in which I served as counsel to a party or an amicus, cases advanc-
ing a constitutional, sex-equality principle.' A prime illustration is
* This text provided the basis for an address delivered by Professor Ginsburg
as the Sixteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar Lecture on November
9, 1979, at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law of the Cleveland State Univer-
sity.
** Professor, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., Cornell Univ.; LL.B.,
Columbia Univ.; U.S. Circuit Judge (D.C. Cir.).
' A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). The title is taken from
Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), The Judges as
Guardians of the Constitution.
2 Id.; see A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 7 (1976).
, See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); California v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); C.f Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979) (imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives
violates Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment).
Outside the confines of an advocate's brief, I have sketched aspects of the
issue. See K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG, & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
94-99 (1974); id. at 99-101 (Supp. 1978). For a student effort to fill in the sketch,
see Note, Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial
Alternative, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 115 (1975).
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Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,' a case the Supreme Court decided in March
1975.
Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged a provision of the Social Security Act5
that authorizes "child in care" payments when a wage earner dies with
a young child surviving.' If the wage earner was a man, there were
monthly benefits for widow and child. If the wage earner was a woman,
there were no benefits for the widower. Wiesenfeld was an ideal case to
demonstrate the insidious side of legislative classifications drawn on the
basis of gender. Summarizing the argument that yielded a unanimous
Supreme Court judgment' for Stephen Wiesenfeld:
The . . . "child in care" Social Security benefit, furnished to
the surviving spouse of a male insured individual, but not to the
surviving spouse of a female insured individual, reflects the
familiar stereotype that, throughout [our] Nation's history, has
operated to devalue women's efforts in the economic sector. The
female insured individual, who is treated equally for Social
Security contribution purposes, is ranked as a secondary bread-
winner for purposes of determining family benefits due under
her account. Just as the female insured individual's status as a
breadwinner is denigrated, so the parental status of her surviv-
ing spouse is discounted. For the sole reason that [Stephen
Wiesenfeld] is a father, not a mother, he is denied benefits that
would permit him to attend personally to the care of his infant
son, a child who has no other parent to provide that care.
The child, who supplies the raison d'etre for the benefit in
question, is the person ultimately disadvantaged by the ...
gender line. A social insurance benefit, which is designed to
facilitate close parent-child association, is not constitutionally
allocated when it includes children with dead fathers, but ex-
cludes children with dead mothers.8
Congress had labeled the payment Stephen Wiesenfeld sought as a
"mother's benefit"; the Supreme Court judgment turned the provision
into a "parent's benefit." In effect, the Court wrote into the statute the
fathers Congress had left out.'
4 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
' 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976).
6 Id Congress has not yet amended the statute to conform to the Supreme
Court's judgment.
' The Court divided 5-2-1 on the appropriate rationale for the judgment.
Justice Rehnquist has since recanted. His concurring vote in Wiesenfeld was an
aberration, an error as he now views the matter. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S.
282, 294 n.12 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.).
' Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
' The Court affirmed a lower court judgment 1) declaring the provision un-
constitutional insofar as it discriminates against widowers on the basis of their
(Vol. 28:301
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"By what right," asked several of my law teaching colleagues.10 They
allowed that the Court perhaps might nullify the mother's benefit and
leave it to Congress to start over from scratch. But lacking the power of
the purse, the Court went out of bounds, they suggested, when it
ordered payment to Stephen Wiesenfeld and others similarly situated.
The Government initially entertained the same view. Before the district
court, it urged dismissal of Stephen Wiesenfeld's complaint. As stated
in the memorandum supporting the Government's motion to dismiss: "It
is clear ... plaintiff does not complain about what Congress enacted [a
mother's benefit]-he complains about what Congress has not enacted.
Plaintiff therefore has chosen the wrong forum to obtain the relief he
seeks. He should take his complaint to Congress."'" But that argument,
were it accepted, would immunize from judicial review statutes that
confer benefits unevenly. The legislature would have power, unchecked
by the judiciary, to contract the equal protection principle in a signifi-
cant class of cases.
12
sex; 2) enjoining the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from denying
benefits under the provision solely on the basis of sex; and 3) ordering payment
of benefits to Stephen Wiesenfeld for all periods during which he would have
qualified but for the sex-based discrimination the statute commanded. 420 U.S. at
653, aff'g 361 F. Supp. 981, 991 (D.N.J. 1973).
0 The question was first put to me by the dean at a well-known law school I
visited the week the Wiesenfeld judgment was announced by the Supreme
Court.
11 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 20, Wiesenfeld v.
Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), affd sub nom. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
12 Cf. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 267-72 (1978) and commentary cited
therein discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress
may not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute [fourteenth amendment] guarantees").
The remedial issue discussed here has surfaced in the wake of High Court deci-
sions uncabining the equal protection guarantee. See generally Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword& Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). Occasions for judicial attention to the
issue were fewer when equal protection was regarded as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
When the rule inconsonant with equal protection is judge-made, courts have
found an extension cure less problematic. See Estate of Sharp, 163 N.J. Super.
148, 394 A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1978) (in lieu of enlarging statute, court extended
equally to all children common law parental inheritance qualification); cf
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 309 (La. 1978), vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Orr v. Orr sub nom. Loyacano v. Le Blanc, 440
U.S. 952 (1979) (unnecessary to tamper with statute authorizing alimony for
wives, but not for husbands, since civil law equity doctrine would permit a court
to award alimony to a needy husband). Compare Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (extending to wives
common law claim for loss of consortium formerly available to husbands only)
with Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849,
138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (striking rather than extending dependency presumption
statute provided for widows, but not for widowers).
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B. First Encounters: Moritz, Frontiero, Kahn
I had briefed the case for judicial extension of underinclusive statutes
on three occasions prior to Wiesenfeld. Moritz v. Commissioner"3
awakened me to the intriguing qualities of the issue. Charles Moritz was
a lifelong bachelor. Although well past sixty-three, he took good care of
his mother. She lived with him, and for the hours he worked away from
home, a nurse was engaged to care for her. At that time, the Internal
Revenue Code allowed to a never-married daughter, but not to a never-
married son, an income tax deduction for part of the cost of a nurse
hired under those circumstances. Charles Moritz had no complaint
against dutiful daughters. He did not seek withdrawal of the deduction
the statute afforded them. Rather, he sought, and the Tenth Circuit
granted, the same benefits for dutiful sons.'"
My next encounter was Frontiero v. Richardson.5 Sharron Frontiero,
an Air Force lieutenant, sought a housing allowance and health care for
her spouse Joseph, benefits accorded automatically to a married ser-
viceman, but denied to a married servicewoman unless she supplied
over three-fourths of the couple's support. The Frontieros succeeded;
the Supreme Court held the statutory scheme invalid only insofar as it
required a female service member to prove the dependency of her
spouse.'
On the third occasion, Kahn v. Shevin, 7 labor on the remedial issue
proved futile. Mel Kahn, a Florida widower, sought a real property tax
exemption state law gave to the blind, the totally disabled, and
widows. 8 The Court upheld the gender classification, a decision out of
step with its subsequent rulings,' 9 but one that rendered moot argument
directed to appropriate relief for the excluded widowers."0
Is 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
14 In Wiesenfeld, the Government sought to distinguish Moritz on this basis:
"By extending the [tax] exemption to include [never married men], the Court did
not require the expenditure of funds from the Treasury." Memorandum in Sup-
port of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 11, at 9. The distinction between funds that
go out and funds that do not come in to the Treasury, however, seems less than
fully persuasive. See generally Dodyk, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Poor,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 758, 758-59 (1971).
15 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
16 Id. at 691 n.25.
'7 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
"s See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (West Supp. 1974-75). At the tax rate ap-
plicable when the case was litigated, the exemption yielded a $15 tax saving.
19 See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223-24 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
I Widower Kahn had urged that whatever the status of the exemption in the
future, widows were accorded the exemption during the years in question, hence
a denial of equal protection could be repaired only by according widowers the ex-
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In Moritz, the deduction extended to never-married men was small
($600 maximum), the class benefited by the judicial repair (lifelong
bachelors who cared for incapacitated relatives) was limited, and the
legislative will was minimally touched. (Congress, prior to the Tenth
Circuit decision, had made the repair itself for subsequent tax years.21)
Similarly, in Frontiero, relatively few persons were immediately af-
fected. The military was overwhelmingly male (in part the result of
highly restrictive quotas on the enlistment of women)," and few female
members were married to civilians. The Department of Defense, prior
to the Frontiero judgment, had reported to Congress that according
female members benefit entitlement on the same basis as male members
would result in no increased budget requirements.13
Was there a tenable distinction between the judicial repair work
sought by Charles Moritz and Sharron Frontiero and the claim pressed
by Stephen Wiesenfeld? The Government emphasized that one dif-
ference was money. The Frontiero judgment cost a comparative pit-
tance, the Government suggested. But HEW price-tagged the "child in
care" benefits at stake in Wiesenfeld at 20 million dollars annually, a
figure escalating to some 500 million dollars, the Solicitor General claim-
ed, if "very closely analogous" social security gender lines should be
held unconstitutional and repaired by extension." The Government did
not feature cost as a reason to choose invalidation over extension.
Rather, it raised the price-tag in the context of the anterior question:
Should the underinclusion pass constitutional review? But whatever in-
fluence budgetary considerations may have on equal protection ad-
judication generally,2 5 the Court has formally rejected fiscal economy as
a justification for a classification that attracts heightened judicial
scrutiny.
III. SUPREME COURT APPROACHES
In 1970, when I began work on the Moritz case, I found few words in
2 See Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 468 n.2 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
See generally M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY (1977).
2 S. REP. No. 1218, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
' See Brief for the Appellant at 22, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Brief for the Appellant at 8, 39, 1A-6A, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977). The estimate may have been substantially inflated. See K. DAVIDSON, R.
GINSBURG, & H. KAY, supra note 3, at 100 n.i (Supp. 1978).
' See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 503 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 406 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). Gender classifica-
tions, the Supreme Court has confirmed, do warrant an elevated standard of
review. See Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4459 (1980); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979).
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court opinions and commentary addressed to the remedy question."
While lines penned were sparse, some notable repairs had in fact been
accomplished by judicial judgment. 8 Today, explicit discussion of the
issue remains thin, but in the 1970s there was notable growth in the
catalog of judgments declaring statutes infirm because underinclusive,
and extending their scope to render them constitutional.2
A. Express Consideration in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank,
Skinner, and Welsh
By the start of the current decade, three Supreme Court decisions
referred expressly to the remedial problem entailed when a measure is
held impermissibly underinclusive: Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v.
Bennett in 1931;10 Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1942;"' and Welsh v. United
States in 1970.2 In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, state of-
ficials, misapplying Iowa law, had exacted tax from a national and a
state bank at a rate higher than that applied to corporations in competi-
tion with them. The Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged systematic
discrimination against the banks but said the assessments they paid
were correct. The error lay in collecting too little from their com-
petitors. Extending the error to the banks by granting their petition for
a refund would compound, not right the wrong, the Iowa Supreme Court
concluded. The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Brandeis, reversed and held the two banks "entitled
to . . . refund of the excess in taxes exacted from them."3 At issue,
Justice Brandeis said, was the "legal effect under the federal law of [the]
wrongful administration of the state law."' He explained why the banks
had a right to the favor accorded their competitors:
' The most trenchant analysis remains Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 334, 335-56, 361-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring), described in text accompanying notes 45-51 infra. An articulate statement
appears in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202, 254 A.2d 525, 529-30 (1969). Earlier
expressions include Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Travis, 262 F. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1919),
aff'd, 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (tax exemptions granted by statute only to state citizens
extended to include citizens of other states); Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1920), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 445
(1921) (workers' compensation benefits extended to nonresidents to cure constitu-
tional infirmity); Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 284 Ky. 753, 145 S.W.2d 1067 (1940)
(plaintiff added to exempt class to cure unconstitutional exclusion); Note, The Ef-
fect of an Unconstitutional Exception Clause Upon the Remainder of a Statute,
55 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1034-36 (1942).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
' See text accompanying notes 53-97 infra.
10 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
1, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
2 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
284 U.S. at 247.
Id. at 241. The national bank relied on a federal statute permitting states to
tax national bank shareholders on condition that the tax rate not exceed
[Vol. 28:301
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It may be assumed that all ground for a claim for refund would
have fallen if the State, promptly upon discovery of the
discrimination, had removed it by collecting the additional taxes
from the favored competitors .... The right invoked is that to
equal treatment; and such treatment will be attained if either
[the banks'] competitors' taxes are increased or their own re-
duced. But it is well settled that a taxpayer who has been sub-
jected to discriminatory taxation through the favoring of others
in violation of federal law, cannot be required himself to assume
the burden of seeking an increase of the taxes which others
should have paid.... Nor may he be remitted to the necessity of
awaiting such action by the state officials upon their own in-
itiative .3
5
Iowa-Des Moines National Bank presented no challenge to the validity
of any state statute; the proper remedy for unequal administration of
state law was the issue. But the relief accorded the banks would have
been no less appropriate had the law itself, rather than official misap-
plication of it, generated the discrimination. In that event, moreover,
due process related concepts of reliance and fair notice would impede
state officials from reaching back to impose and collect "additional taxes
from the favored competitors."36
Next in time, Skinner v. Oklahoma37 held Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act incompatible with equal protection. The Act
encompassed "felonies involving moral turpitude," including larceny,
but specifically exempted violations of "prohibitory laws, revenue acts,
embezzlement, or political offenses."38 A "conspicuously artificial" line
assessments on other moneyed capital in the hands of state citizens. Both banks
invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the state bank
placing sole reliance on that clause. Id. at 244, 245.
Id at 247.
Id But c.f. Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97 (1887), where a statute on the
taxation of all railroads exempted specified property (embankments, tunnels, cuts,
ties, trestles, and bridges) from assessment. The state constitution, however, pro-
vided that "all laws exempting property from taxation other than is provided [in the
constitution] shall be void." On advice of the state attorney general, the railroad
commissioners treated the statutory exemptions as invalid and assessed tax on
all railroad property within the state. The state supreme court upheld this action
on the ground that the exemption clause of the statute was inconsistent with the
state constitution. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting a claim
that taxing property excluded by the state statute violated due process. The con-
flict between the statutory exemption and the state constitution was "obvious,"
the Court said; therefore the railroad commissioners' disregard of the exemption
and their assessment of all property was an appropriate course. Apparently, in
this setting, the Court regarded as strained any claim that taxing the specified
property was unforeseeable, or that justified reliance had been placed on the ex-
emptions.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 536-37.
1979]
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separated larceny from embezzlement, Justice Douglas pointed out.
Under the laws of Oklahoma the two crimes involved "intrinsically the
same quality of offense," the only real distinction being the time when
the fraudulent or felonious intent arose.39 Sterilization for the one crime
but not for the other thus violated "the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.""0 In a cryptic conclusion, the Supreme Court "left for
adjudication by the Oklahoma court" the question whether the law could
be salvaged by application of the Act's broad severability clause to
enlarge, or to contract, the class of criminals subject to sterilization."1
The suggestion that the Oklahoma court might respond to a
larcenist's plea to be spared sterilization by spreading the penalty to
embezzlers merited closer analysis. Prospective enlargement of the Act
by excising the exemption for embezzlers would not have altered
larcenist Skinner's stituation. The law would have remained uneven as
applied to him absent retrospective application to embezzlers. But
retrospective enlargement, even if an answer to the equal protection
problem, would cure one infirmity by substituting another. Such adjust-
ment could not accommodate regard for a due process fair notice re-
quirement. 2
Welsh v. United States'3 yielded a more comprehensive analysis, but
not in an opinion for the Court. The analysis appeared in a concurring
opinion by Justice Harlan to which no other justice subscribed." Welsh
concerned the military service exemption Congress provided for con-
scientious objectors opposed to all wars "based on religious training and
belief." Welsh, a conscientious objector who expressly denied entertain-
ing "religious" beliefs, but grounded his opposition on moral and ethical
beliefs, had been convicted for refusal to submit to induction. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The prevailing opinion, to
Id. at 539, 541-42.
40 Id. at 541.
41 Id. at 543. On remand, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was equally cryptic. It
held the Act could not be salvaged: "[T]he Act is plain in including those convicted
of larceny ... and in excluding ... persons convicted of embezzlement. We can-
not, therefore, use the severability clause ... to invade the legislative field so as
to make the act comply with the requirements of the equal protection clause as
suggested." Skinner v. State, 195 Okla. 106, 106-07, 155 P.2d 715, 716 (1945).
42 Unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroac-
tively, has been held inconsistent with due process. See Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1964);
Wilson v. State, 288 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1974); 82 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1969).
See also Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979), described in note 114 infra.
Note, however, that habitual offender laws may reach felons whose earlier
crimes were committed prior to enactment of the statute augmenting punish-
ment. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180
U.S. 311, 313 (1901).
43 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
" Id. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 28:301
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which four justices adhered, interpreted the word "religious" broadly;
the exemption, as written, covered Welsh, the opinion ventured, despite
his characterization of his beliefs as "nonreligious."
Justice Harlan thought his brethren's construction at odds with the
meaning Congress intended. Congress plainly had limited the exemption
to theistic beliefs, he concluded, but that limitation ran afoul of the first
amendment's establishment clause, Justice Harlan maintained. Given
the context in which the question was presented, the only result consis-
tent with the Constitution was reversal of Welsh's conviction, Harlan
said. For exemption had been accorded others "whose beliefs were iden-
tical in all respects to those held by [Welsh] except that they derived
from a religious source." 5 This "religious benefit" unconstitutionally
fenced out Welsh, who would "go remediless" if the conviction were
allowed to stand.'6
Harlan described the relief he thought mandated for Welsh as "tanta-
mount to extending the statute,"" and said he would have voted for ex-
tension, even if the question had been presented in a declaratory judg-
ment or injunction suit. In that event, assuming Harlan was right that
leaving out the nontheistic objector violated the establishment clause,
Welsh would have been placed on the same footing as "religious" objec-
tors before any criminal conviction could eventuate. Hence, the Court
would have faced a choice betwen enlargement and abrogation of the ex-
emption.
As to the authority of the Court to add a class (nontheistic objectors)
deliberately left out by Congress, Harlan wrote:
If an important congressional policy is to be perpetuated by
recasting unconstitutional legislation [as Harlan thought the
prevailing opinion had done] the analytically sound approach is
to accept responsibility for [the] decision. Its justification cannot
be by resort to legislative intent, as that term is usually
41 Id at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4 Id But see People v. Henry, 131 Cal. App. 82, 21 P.2d 672 (1933) (criminal
statute by its terms applicable to defendant exempted others similarly situated;
court declared the exemption unconstitutional and affirmed defendant's convic-
tion).
" 398 U.S. at 363-64 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, dissenting, agreed with Justice Harlan that
Congress had excluded the "nonreligious" objector, but thereafter parted com-
pany with him. The dissenters thought the Court had no warrant to rewrite the
statute; hence, if the limitation to "religious" objectors violated the establish-
ment clause, the draft exemption should fall. But Welsh would not benefit from
such a holding, they said, therefore he lacked standing. But see note 103 infra.
Alternately, the dissenting opinion continued, even if Welsh had standing, his
conviction should be affirmed because limiting conscientious objector status to
those with religious beliefs did not violate the first amendment. 398 U.S. at 367
(White, Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1979]
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employed, but by a different kind of legislative intent, namely,
the presumed grant of power to the courts to decide whether it
more nearly accords with Congress' wishes to eliminate its
policy altogether or extend it in order to render what Congress
plainly did intend, constitutional.48
Citing Skinner and Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, Harlan elaborated:
"Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion, there exist two
remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by exclusion." 9 Factors relevant to the choice, he
said, included the presence or absence of a severability clause, ° the in-
tensity of the legislative commitment to the policy at issue (in Welsh,
exempting conscientious objectors), and "the degree of potential disrup-
tion of the statutory scheme [or other legislative goals] that would occur
by extension as opposed to abrogation."51
The remedial discussion in Welsh remained expressly identified with
only one justice until June 1979 when, in Califano v. Westcott,"2 all
members of the Court embraced the Harlan analysis, although they
divided sharply (5-4) on its application to the statute before them. I will
comment on the Westcott decision after spotlighting the remarkable
development that preceded it.
B. Tacit Extensions
Without calling attention to or explaining its remedial choice, the
Supreme Court effectively extended several benefit statutes upon find-
ing them vulnerable to equal protection challenge. High court decisions
from 1968 to 1978 implicitly holding extension rather than nullification
the proper course may be sorted into three categories: (1) cases in which
a member of the class excluded by the legislation sought recovery from
a private person; (2) cases involving government benefit programs in
which the remedy did not call for increased spending, but required divi-
sion of a fixed amount among a larger beneficiary class than the legisla-
tion specified; (3) cases, like Frontierol and Wiesenfeld,M in which the
"B Id at 355-56 (Harlan, J., concurring).
, Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id at 364 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968); Note, supra note 27, at 1036 (discounting practical
significance of severability clause).
51 398 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring).
443 U.S. 76 (1979).
1 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See text accompanying notes
15-16 supra.
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extension remedy necessitated payments beyond those the legislature
authorized.
Levy v. Louisiana5 typifies the first category. The Court declared in-
consistent with equal protection legislative exclusion of children born
out of wedlock from a right to recover against a tortfeasor for the
wrongful death of their mother. More recently, in Gomez v. Perez," the
Court extended to children of unwed parents a right to paternal support
Texas law posited only for children of wed parents.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.' illustrates the no-cost repair to a
state-operated benefit program. Louisiana's workers' compensation
scheme stipulated a maximum recovery for surviving dependents;
unacknowledged children born out of wedlock could share in the
recovery only if amounts allocated to others did not exceed the max-
imum. The Court held dependent children, regardless of birth status, en-
titled to equal portions of the stipulated maximum recovery. Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. was dispositive of later cases challenging a
similar ranking of children in federal social security legislation.'
The first and perhaps still most spectacular entry in the third
category-the one in which judicial extension immediately increased
the toll on the public fisc-was Shapiro v. Thompson." The Court con-
fronted the determination of at least forty states and Congress,
legislating for the District of Columbia, that public money should not be
spent on welfare aid to persons who had not satisfied a durational (one-
year) residence requirement. The judgment invalidated the waiting
period, thereby adding the newcomers to the public assistance rolls. The
Shapiro v. Thompson route was followed in Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County,"0 in which the Court invalidated Arizona's require-
ment that an indigent reside in a county for one year before qualifying
for non-emergency medical care at county expense.
Extensions of the same genre were effected in Graham v.
Richardson,6 when the Court ruled state legislatures had unconstitu-
tionally excluded resident aliens from public assistance programs, in
m 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968), where the Court ruled the same way when a mother sued for the
wrongful death of her out-of-wedlock child.
w 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In this case, as in Levy, the defendant was not sym-
pathetically situated to complain that the retroactive change in the law made by
court decree denied him fair notice that the conduct in which he engaged might
generate a monetary obligation. Nor could defendant plausibly claim justified
reliance on exemption from responsibility.
5' 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S.
1069 (1972).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
1, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,2 in which the Court
invalidated exclusion of families with parents who were not
"ceremonially married to each other" from New Jersey's program for
"Assistance to Families of the Working Poor," in United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno,3 when the Court struck down a congressionally-
imposed limitation on food stamp distribution to households in which
members are related,"4 and in Jiminez v. Weinberger,5 when the Court
held Congress had unconstitutionally excluded from social security
disability benefits certain children born out of wedlock after the onset
of the wage earner's disability."
Presented with this array of expensive sub silentio extensions,67 the
Court held to the same course when the gender classification social
security cases following up Frontiero and Wiesenfeld came before it,
cases the Solicitor General had price-tagged at 500 million dollars.66 In
Califano v. Goldfarb and companion cases, 9 the Court held Congress
violated equal protection by authorizing derivative social security
benefits for wives and widows without regard to dependency, but
withholding such benefits from husbands and widowers unless the
wage-earning wife supplied at least three-fourths of the couple's sup-
port." As in Frontiero," the scheme was held invalid only insofar as it
required husbands and widowers to prove their dependency.
C. The Federalism Concern
In Welsh v. United States,"2 Justice Harlan, citing Skinner v.
62 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
Cf Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (invalidating on
a due process "conclusive presumption" ground rather than straight equal protec-
tion analysis another limitation in the Food Stamp Act).
417 U.S. 628 (1974).
" But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
67 Lower courts followed the High Court example. See, e.g., Demiragh v.
DeVos, 476 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973); Vaccarella v. Fusari, 365 F. Supp. 1164 (D.
Conn. 1973); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973); Miller v. Laird, 349
F. Supp. 1034 (D.D.C. 1972). Compare Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75
N.J. 62, 379 A.2d 848 (1977) and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 App. Div. 2d
8, 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1976) (excising proof of dependency requirement imposed on
widower but not widow applying for workers' compensation death benefits) with
Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1977) (striking rather than extending dependency presumption).
I See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
69 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
76 Id. at 204-17. The price-tag may have influenced some votes on the Court.
The comfortable 8-1 count in Frontiero and unanimous judgment in Wiesenfeld
dwindled to a close 5-4 in Goldfarb. On the congressional response to Goldfarb,
see note 100 infra.
' See text accompanying note 16 supra.
7 398 U.S. 333 (1970), described in text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
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Oklahoma,"' noted that the Supreme Court enjoys wider discretion to
extend federal law than it does to recast "a policy for the States even as
a constitutional remedy."7 But state legislation was tacitly extended in
Levy v. Louisiana,7 Gomez v. Perez,7 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
77
Shapiro v. Thompson,78 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,"9
Graham v. Richardson" and New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill." Nothing was said in these 1968-1974 decisions of the Supreme
Court's "more limited discretion" to extend state legislation. Perhaps
the Court thought it obvious in this string of cases that the state
legislature would want the statute to survive. In three of the seven
cases, litigation was initiated in a federal forum, ' thus disposition on re-
mand would not be in the hands of state court judges.83
In 1975, in Stanton v. Stanton,8' however, the Court focused on the
federalism concern alluded to by Justice Douglas in Skinner and noted
by Justice Harlan in Welsh. Utah law required a parent to support a son
until age twenty-one, a daughter only until age eighteen. Litigation was
pursued in the Utah courts to impose on James Stanton the obligation
to support his daughter Sherri for the period between her eighteenth
and twenty-first birthdays. Reversing the Utah Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court held the sex line could not survive equal
protection attack. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, concluded
the opinion by observing that "[t]he appellant, although prevailing here
on the federal constitutional issue, may or may not ultimately win her
lawsuit."85 The age at which a support right terminates had to be the
73 316 U.S. 535 (1942), described in text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
"' 398 U.S. at 363 n.15 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
76 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
" 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
7 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
8 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
82 New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 291 (1924), observing that the
Supreme Court will decide a severability question regarding state legislation
when the case comes from a lower federal court, and may (but is not obliged to)
decide such a question when the case comes from a state court.
I But lower federal courts, most notably when diversity jurisdiction is in-
voked, are accustomed to deciding the issues as they believe a state tribunal
would. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 708-10 (2d ed.
1973).
" 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
' Id at 18. But see text accompanying notes 132-34 infra (suggesting equal
protection may have required support for the daughter in Stanton until 21 even if
18 thereafter became the age of majority for both sexes).
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same for boy and girl, that was the federal command; but whether the
age should be eighteen or twenty-one, Justice Blackmun said, "was
plainly an issue of state law to be resolved on remand."86
In Orr v. Orr7, decided four years after Stanton, the Supreme Court
similarly deferred to state court decision makers. William Orr resisted
paying alimony to his former wife. In the Alabama courts he urged, un-
successfully, that the state law, which provided that husbands, but not
wives, may be required to pay alimony, violated equal protection. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. It held the gender
classification unconstitutional and left it to the Alabama courts to
decide whether to extend (permit awards to husbands as well as wives)
or invalidate (deny alimony to both parties). 9
D. High Court Views in the Most Recent Return: Califano v. Westcott
Califano v. Westcott' marks the Court's latest and fullest considera-
tion of the remedial problem inherent in challenges to underinclusive
statutes. Westcott also displays the full Court's sharpened perception of
the equal protection infirmity in statutes that classify explicitly on the
basis of gender.
At issue in Westcott was the public assistance program Congress had
structured for families with two able-bodied parents in the home. Con-
gress authorized family benefits where children had been deprived of
parental support because of the father's unemployment, but allowed no
benefits when the mother's unemployment occasioned the deprivation.
Complainants were couples whose benefit applications were rejected
because the father did not have a prior work force history sufficient to
qualify the family, although the mother did. The Court held unanimously
that the gender classification lacked the requisite close relationship to
the attainment of an important government goal. The line drawn by
Congress was freighted with the "baggage of sexual stereotypes," the
Court said, presumptions that man's principal work is breadwinning,
while woman's is hearthtending. "Legislation that rests on such
presumptions, without more," all agreed, cannot survive equal protec-
tion scrutiny.9'
421 U.S. at 17-18. By comparison, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the
Court held inconsonant with equal protection an Oklahoma law that allowed girls
to purchase 3.2 beer at 18, but required boys to wait until age 21. The case had
come up from a lower federal court. The Supreme Court did not refer, as it did in
Stanton, to the task left to the tribunal below on remand. Rather, it simply noted
that "the Oklahoma Legislature is free to redefine any cut off age ... provided
that the redefinition operates in a gender-neutral fashion." Id. at 210 n.24.
87 440 U.S. 268 (1979). For further comment on Orr, see text accompanying
notes 115-17, 135-36 infra.
440 U.S. at 271.
89 Id. at 282-83. Accord, Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4459
(1980).
90 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
91 Id. at 89.
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All agreed as well that Justice Harlan in Welsh had correctly framed
the remedial alternatives: nullification of the statute, thus withdrawing
benefits from the class the legislature intended to cover, or extension of
the statute's coverage to encompass those aggrieved by the exclusion."
Further, all agreed that a third course, proposed by the Massachusetts
Public Welfare Department Commissioner, was unacceptable.
The Commissioner had urged adding on a principal wage earner
criterion. Either parent's unemployment would count, but to qualify the
family, one parent would have to show that he or she is both
unemployed and the family's principal wage earner. Perhaps the Com-
missioner's proposal captured what Congress in fact intended, the full
Court speculated. But this approach posed "definitional and policy ques-
tions" judges are ill-equipped to resolve.13 For example, is the principal
breadwinner one who earns fifty-one, fifty-five, or seventy-five percent
of the family's income?" Over what time span must the breadwinner
earn the requisite principal share? What income counts in the calcula-
tion? Restructuring involving fine tuning of that variety, the Court
regarded as a task properly left to the legislature.
Thereafter, the justices split. A bare majority approved straightfor-
ward extension as the "simplest and most equitable" remedy for these
reasons: (1) suspending the program would impose hardship on needy
children Congress plainly meant to protect; (2) the Social Security Act's
"strong severability clause" evidenced congressional intent to maintain
social welfare programs intact whenever possible; (3) no party sought
nullification; and (4) previous Supreme Court decisions had "routinely ...
affirmed district court judgments ordering extension of federal welfare
programs," thus indicating the constitutional competence of federal
courts to grant such relief. 5
Four justices dissented in part in an opinion written by Justice
Powell. Nullification should have been the remedy, they argued,
9 Id. at 86-88, 94. Agreement that Justice Harlan's formulation in Welsh ac-
curately stated the framework for the Court's inquiry was particularly signifi-
cant, for in Welsh itself, three justices had indicated disagreement with Harlan's
approach, see note 47 supra, and four had avoided the issue by statutory con-
struction, see text following note 44 supra.
11 443 U.S. at. 95 n.1. See H.R. 4321, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4904,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1290, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposing
alteration of the legislation by replacing the term "father" with the term "parent
who is the principal earner," defined as the parent who "earned the greater
amount of income in the six-month period" immediately preceding the application
for aid).
I The statutory dependency tests in issue in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), required proof that
the wife supplied "over" or "at least" three-fourths of the couple's support. See
text following note 15 supra; text accompanying note 70 supra.
" 443 U.S. at 88-93.
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because: (1) the legislative history of the particular benefit program af-
forded no secure basis for predicting what Congress would have done
had it known the classification it adopted constituted impermissible
gender-based discrimination; (2) extension sparing hardship to current
beneficiaries might occasion "other hardships . .. in the allocation of
limited [welfare] funds"; (3) Congress could mitigate benefit termination
hardship by reinstating the program in the form it deems appropriate
and "providing promptly for retroactive payments.""w It is "irrelevant,"
Justice Powell noted, that no party sought an order declaring the
statute a nullity, for the intent of Congress, not the interests of the par-
ties, should control.97
IV. SOME THREADS PULLED TOGETHER
A. Extension or Invalidation: A Temporary Legislative Remedy
On first reading, Justice Powell's dismissal of the interests of the par-
ties in Westcott as "irrelevant" may startle and disconcert. Doesn't that
notion clash with a basic premise of our system that the parties, not the
court, define the boundaries of the case or controversy? To borrow from
the Government's characterization in the lower court in Wiesenfeld,98 in
the right or benefit extension cases, the challengers complained about
what the legislature excluded, not about what it included. The com-
plainants did not invoke the "mutual suffering" theory; they confined
their complaint to what the legislature left out. A judgment withdraw-
ing rights or benefits from others would be a pyrrhic victory for the
challengers, it would not conform to the contours of the controversy
shaped by the parties. But can the parties subject the court to Hobson's
choice-if the benefit statute is found unconstitutional as written, must
the court extend because the parties propose that remedy only? I think
Justice Powell supplied the right answer, and will try to explain why.
Preliminary, I should note my agreement with the Westcott majority
that extension was the proper remedy in that case. The probable will of
the legislature, not simply what the parties sought, seems to me to sup-
port the majority's judgment. The marked congressional trend has been
to eliminate gender-based differentials in benefit statutes by enlarging
coverage;" in no instance has Congress effected equalization by closing
Id at 94-96 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id at 96 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). For recent, clear state court analysis,
see Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75 N.J. 62, 379 A.2d 848 (1977) (extend-
ing to spouse of female worker workers' compensation death benefits statute
authorized only for spouse of male worker).
See text accompanying note 11 supra.
" See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7152 (1976) (any law providing a benefit to a male
federal employee, his spouse or family shall be deemed to provide the same
benefit to a female federal employee, her spouse or family); 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (1976);
38 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976) (preferences and allowances for wives or widows of
veterans fully extended to husbands and widowers). Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
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down a program, thus terminating benefits to all.100
But assume the dissenters were right in Westcott, that in this in-
stance Congress would have preferred demolition of the entire program
to salvage by extension. If a court concludes the legislature would not
want the statute to survive, is nullification nonetheless foreclosed
because the challengers urged only extension and had no interest in pur-
suing a claim to invalidate the program? The answer, I believe, turns on
candid recognition of the role the court assumes when it reaches the
remedy question.
When the court passes on the constitutionality of a statute in cases
like Westcott, it concludes its essentially judicial business. If it declares
the statute unconstitutional as written, the remaining task is essentially
legislative. The legislature, however, cannot be convened on the spot.
The interim solution, therefore, must come from the court. The court's
function, then, is to serve as short-term surrogate for the legislature. In
performing that function, the court cannot be hemmed in by the parties'
presentation. It must focus principally on the legislative design, ' not
the parties' pleadings.
In sum, the underinclusive benefit statute cases pose a dilemma for
the courts. If they eschew a remedy that entails "legislating," they must
withdraw from the field, leaving line drawing to the political branches
without judicial oversight.'2 If they accept responsibility for constitu-
tional review of allegedly discriminatory classifications, they must also
recognize that a challenger who prevails on the constitutional issue is
not necessarily entitled to a court decree awarding the benefit he or she
seeks. Indeed, if the court responds by invalidating the benefit, not only
will the challenger fail to achieve positive relief, but the benefit will be
withdrawn from those the legislature plainly intended to aid.' 3 In my
WOMEN'S BUREAU, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 328 (1975) (formerly
"women only" minimum wage laws extended to men); Note, Presumption of
Dependence in Workers' Compensation Benefits as a Denial of Equal Protection,
9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 138, 139, 161 n.161 (1975) (state workers' compensation
legislation amended to extend conclusive presumption of dependency to
widowers).
'0 In response to Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 69-71 supra, Congress repealed the dependency requirement
for husbands and widowers, but added a "set off' for pensions received by wives,
widows, husbands and widowers engaged in public employment not covered by
social security. Reflecting concern that the set off would defeat reasonable expec-
tations of female public employees, Congress postponed application of the amend-
ment to them for a five year period. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1977). See H. CONF. REP. No.
95-837, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4308, 4317-18.
0' Because the court acts only provisionally, it uses primary colors and does
not attempt shading in adjusting the design. See text accompanying note 94
supra.
' See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
'0 So long as the constitutional claim offers the challenger a prospect for the
remedy he or she seeks, standing and "case or controversy" requirements would
19791
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view, abandoning constitutional review is an unacceptable course.
Therefore, I think the Supreme Court is on the right track in ad-
judicating challenges to underinclusive benefit statutes while recogniz-
ing that the parties cannot control the choice between extension and in-
validation.
B. Considerations Relevant to the Choice Between Extension
and Invalidation
Earlier, I noted two general guides to the choice between extension
and invalidation Justice Harlan set out in Welsh:..4 the strength of the
legislature's commitment to the residual policy or program in question,
and the disruption a solution one way or the other would entail.15
Among more particular decision-influencing factors, a prominent con-
sideration is the size of the class extension would encompass, in com-
parison to the size of the class the legislature included.
When a member of a relatively small class seeks access to a right or
benefit enjoyed by a substantially larger class, it seems a fair guess that
the legislature would prefer to preserve what it authorized even if
preservation requires enlarging the benefited class. That was the pic-
ture in the string of cases in which Supreme Court judgments tacitly ex-
tended both federal and state legislation.' For example, denying pater-
nal support to all Texas children because the state had excluded
children born out of wedlock would have been a bizarre result in Gomez
v. Perez. 7 Similarly, terminating welfare assistance to all because
states had excluded newcomers would have been a perverse resolution
in Shapiro v. Thompson."8
But suppose extension would yield a large percentage increase in
persons covered by the statute. That was apparently the case in Bastardo
v. Warren,"0 ' in which male agricultural workers sought extension to
them of a state minimum wage law applicable by its terms only to
appear satisfied. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1979). As to potential due
process objections by persons from whom benefits would be withdrawn, see text
accompanying notes 119-22, 127-37 infra.
104 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
105 For an attempt to enumerate guides in more detail, see Note, supra note 3.
106 See text accompanying notes 53-81 supra. A recent case in point is Andrade
v. Nadel, 477 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), extending to resident aliens state
veterans' preference limited by statute to citizens.
10 See note 56 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Carr v. Campbell Soup
Co., 124 N.J. Super. 382, 388, 307 A.2d 126, 129 (App. Div. 1973) (legislature was
not so bent on denying benefits to grandchildren born out of wedlock that it
would prefer workers' compensation dependency provisions to fall in their en-
tirety).
108 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
100 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500 (W.D. Wis. 1970). For further comment on Bas-
tardo, see text accompanying notes 127-31 infra.
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women and children. The federal district court judge indicated he was
prepared to decide whether the statute was constitutional as written,
but was not inclined to extend its coverage. There was substantial
doubt whether the legislature would have enacted the statute, he
thought, "had it known that the [provision] would be construed to pro-
tect men as well as women and minors."' ' 0
C. Relief From a Burden
Analysis of extension versus invalidation problems is further aided by
distinguishing between claims for access to a benefit and requests for
relief from a burden. When the legislature has provided a benefit, the
challenger is ordinarily a person left out who seeks to be let in."' When
a burden is imposed, however, the challenger will be a person covered
by the statute who seeks to be let out. Criminal and tax statutes are
prime examples. Retroactive extension of criminal legislation is in-
hibited by the ban on ex post facto laws."' Due process considerations of
reliance and fair notice would deter such extension in both categories."3
Nor is prospective extension of a tax, penalty or other burden an
altogether satisfactory response, for that would leave the challenger
unrelieved with respect to past unequal treatment."' But no across-the-
10 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5503. Plaintiffs in Bastardo placed principal reliance
on the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause but also asserted that the
state law was inconsistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Male employees and, more often, employers have challenged
as inconsistent with the federal ban on sex discrimination in employment state
laws stipulating a minimum wage, premium pay, rest breaks or lunch breaks for
women only. Most courts, taking into account the mixed motives implicated in
passage of such legislation (some conceiving the laws as protecting women,
others as discouraging employers from hiring women) and the economic burden
extension would impose on employers, have invalidated the provisions. See, e.g.,
Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976); Doctor's Hosp., Inc. v. Recio, 383 F. Supp. 409
(D.P.R. 1974); Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 997 (S.D. Cal. 1972); State v.
Fairfield Communities Land Co., 260 Ark. 277, 538 S.W.2d 698, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1004 (1976); Vick v. Pioneer Oil Co., 569 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1978)
(relying on state equal rights amendment and Title VII). But cf. 1975 HANDBOOK
ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 99, at 328 (legislative extensions of state
minimum wage provisions to cover men as well as women).
I" But see cases cited in note 110 supra, in which employers urged removal of
an arguable benefit from female employees because state law did not require pro-
viding the benefit to male employees.
"2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal law); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (state
law).
"1 See cases cited in note 42 supra; text accompanying notes 36, 42 supra.
"' See Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979), in which a conviction under
the state's "Fondling Statute" was overturned on appeal. The statute made it a
felony for any "male person" over 18 "to handle . . . any part of [the] body" of a
child under 14 for the purpose of "gratifying his lust" or "indulging his depraved
licentious sexual desires." The sex-based classification denied men equal protec-
1979]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
board rule will accommodate the range of human situations burden-
imposing legal regulations address. In some settings, burden extension
may be a course more appropriate than invalidation. Orr v. Orr"' is a
case in point.
William Orr persuaded the Supreme Court that Alabama law
authorizing alimony for wives, never husbands, was inconsistent with
equal protection. But he had not sought alimony for himself. Rather, he
was attempting to avoid a judgment ordering him to pay his wife. The
remedy he requested was invalidation. On remand,"' the Alabama court
held William Orr should not be relieved of the alimony judgment
outstanding against him. The constitutional defect in the law, the court
ruled, should be cured by extension. That disposition preserved the
dominant legislative purpose; abolishing alimony would have thwarted
the core policy." 7
The Orr case does not parallel Iowa-Des Moines National Bank"8 in
which the Iowa banks sought and, by Supreme Court command, obtained
a refund of taxes imposed on them but not on their competitors. William
Orr could assert no disadvantage vis-i-vis a commercial competitor, as
the Iowa banks could. It may be that in the past financially secure wives
in Alabama had escaped paying husbands in need. William Orr complained
of his disfavored treatment in comparison to the hypothesized well-to-do
wives. But the past failure of hypothetical needy husbands in Alabama
to mount constitutional challenges against their financially secure wives
(challenges the decisions in Orr in the Supreme Court and, on remand,
in Alabama, indicated would have succeeded) seems an inadequate
tion, the court ruled. Extension was not a possible response, a six-member ma-
jority thought, for it was the clear legislative intent to exclude females.
Moreover, the majority said, the court could not create a crime by construction.
Three justices dissented, agreeing that the statute as written was unconstitu-
tional, but maintaining that extension was the appropriate solution in view of the
overriding child-protective purpose of the legislation. Striking the word male
would not violate due process or the prohibition against ex post facto laws, the
dissenters said, so long as the statute's application to females was not retroac-
tive. The male defendant could not complain because he had notice; females who
"fondled" after a court declaration extending the statute would also have notice.
Not explicitly considered in the dissenters' analysis is the point made by Justice
Harlan in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See text accompanying
notes 45-47 supra. The Constitution mandated relief for defendant Welsh, Harlan
reasoned, because persons similarly situated, i.e., "religious" objectors, were not
subject to prosecution at the time Welsh, the nontheistic objector, was tried and
convicted. 398 U.S. at 362-63 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1 440 U.S. 268 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
374 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1979).
117 Id. at 896-97. Accord, Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978); Thaler v. Thaler,
89 Misc. 2d 315, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 58 App. Div.
2d 890, 396 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977).
118 See notes 30, 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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ground on which to sustain William Orr's proposed interim solution -
elimination of alimony until the legislature convenes and rewrites the
law.
D. Impact on Persons Not Before the Courts
A judgment invalidating a benefit statute takes something of value
from a class not before the court. Similarly, a judgment extending a
burden imposes an obligation on a class that has not participated in the
proceeding." In Bastardo v. Warren,1 2 0 for example, nullification of the
state minimum wage law would withdraw a benefit from female
agricultural workers, and in Orr v. Orr,"'1 affluent Alabama wives were
made subject to alimony claims by needy husbands. Are persons so af-
fected by a court's judgment denied due process? If the point is well
taken that the court, when it decides on the remedy, is in fact
legislating, albeit provisionally, the answer, at least to the extent the
judgment operates prospectively, must be no.1 22 No tenable constitu-
tional objection could be raised to a legislative act terminating a state
minimum wage provision, or to a legislative measure removing gender
as a factor in alimony awards. Thus no objection should be available
119 If an extension remedy is granted, a corresponding obligation will be im-
posed, normally on the defendant, for example, the tortfeasor in Levy v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the father in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), a
public authority in the social welfare cases, see notes 58-71 supra. But see Bastardo
v. Warren, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (cost of extension sought by
plaintiffs in proceeding against state authorities would be borne by employers).
The burden extension situation treated here, however, is not the reverse side of
a benefit extension. Rather, the case is one in which a burdened challenger seeks
invalidation, but the court's judgment calls for extension, thus leaving the
challenger where he or she started, while effecting equalization by imposing the
burden on similarly situated persons not before the court.
120 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
121 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
1 2 On the remedial issue, the interests of the challenger and of the affected
persons not before the court coincide. A challenger seeking access to a benefit
will urge preservation of the statute, one seeking to avoid a burden will urge it
should be imposed on none. On the constitutional issue, the party seeking to
uphold the statute as written generally has an interest compatible with that of
the class whom invalidation of a benefit or extension of a burden would effect. Con-
trast the situation presented in a "reverse discrimination" case, for example, a claim
by an unsuccessful male applicant charging that an employer or educational in-
stitution unlawfully prefers women. E.g., Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 586 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir. 1978). Given notice and the opportunity to
participate, the women affected might establish that no preference in fact ex-
isted, or that past discrimination by the defendant justified a remedial
preference. The defendant employer or institution, on the other hand, although
willing to describe its conduct as "voluntary affirmative action," may not
vigorously defend against the charge of preference and is unlikely to plead its
own past discrimination. See generally Comment, The Case for Minority Par-
ticipation in Reverse Discrimination Litigation, 67 CAL. L. REV. 191 (1979).
1979]
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when the court functions, of necessity, as short-term surrogate for the
legislature.
E. Relief for Past Unequal Treatment
There remains the question of relief for past unequal treatment. I
alluded to a facet of the problem earlier in relation to criminal and tax
legislation. In Welsh v. United States,"3 Justice Harlan indicated he
would hold the challenger entitled to reversal of his conviction (because
"religious" objectors at the time of Welsh's trial were not subject to
prosecution) even if Harlan believed Congress would opt to invalidate
rather than extend the conscientious objector exemption.' 2' Similarly, in
Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett,' Justice Brandeis held the
banks entitled to a refund of taxes already paid, although he recognized
that for future years, state officials could tax all similarly situated
enterprises at the higher rate.
In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank and Welsh, government (or the
public at large) would bear the cost of retroactive adjustment. Since
government or government officers were responsible for the uneven
law or official treatment, redress for the past appeared just, perhaps, as
Justice Harlan put it, even mandated by the Constitution.2 ' Is
retrospective relief equally appropriate when a private individual or en-
tity would bear the cost of correcting past, officially-sanctioned
discrimination? Countervailing due process considerations must be
weighed in such cases.
Bastardo v. Warren,'27 the case in which plaintiffs sought extension of
the state minimum wage for women to male agricultural workers, is il-
lustrative. Even if the court were inclined to extend the statute, relief
for the past exacted from the pockets of employers would seem inconsis-
tent with notions of fair notice and justified reliance." 8 The employment
in question was not covered by federal minimum wage and equal pay re-
quirements,'" and the vulnerability of the state law to equal protection
attack was not evident." ° Indeed, at the time litigation was initiated, the
1 398 U.S. 333 (1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
"I Id. at 362-63 (Harlan, J., concurring).
125 284 U.S. 239 (1931), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
27 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
"' As a further impediment to such relief in Bastardo, suit had been brought
against state authorities charged with administration of the state minimum wage
law. Employers were not participants in the proceeding.
"' The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), was added as an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 209-219 (1976),
governing wages and hours. Exclusions from coverage are enumerated in 29
U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976).
13o C.f. note 36 supra (taxing of property excluded by state statute did not violate
due process). As to the application of Title VII's ban on discrimination "against any
individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual's.., sex,"
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976), see note 110 supra.
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Supreme Court had not yet held any gender line unconstitutional.1 3 '
Contrast Stanton v. Stanton,3 ' a case in which, it seems to me, the
equal treatment claim outweighed any argument for the defendant-
father resting on repose, reliance or fair notice. Sherri Stanton, the
daughter for whom paternal support was sought until age twenty-one,
was an ultimate loser. The Utah Supreme Court, on remand,3 3 chose
eighteen, not twenty-one as the determinative age. That left Sherri
disadvantaged vis-a-vis boys born the same year who, with the law's
backing, had already received support until twenty-one. Utah could well
set the age at eighteen for both sexes prospectively, but practically, it
could not "equalize down" retroactively. James Stanton, Sherri's father,
did not create the uneven line, but his situation seems barely
distinguishable from that of the unwed father required to provide child
support in Gomez v. Perez."
Orr v. Orr131 perhaps falls between Bastardo, in which the due process
claim against retroactive extension seems overriding, and Stanton, in
which the equal treatment interest seems paramount. Well-to-do wives
in Alabama are now subject to alimony claims by husbands in need. But
no affluent wife figured in Orr, and a finality interest exists regarding
relations already severed. It appears that a time-bar would operate in
Alabama to preclude a husband who did not seek alimony in the divorce
proceeding from asserting a claim for maintenance belatedly.3 '
These illustrations hardly cover the waterfront, but they do suggest a
few guideposts. The case for retrospective relief seems stronger when
government rather than a private person will bear the cost of curing
laws written or administered with an uneven hand. 3 7 When a private
"' See generally Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TULANE L.
REV. 451 (1978).
132 421 U.S. 7 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
13 552 P.2d 112 (Utah 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 501, thereafter
resolved, 564 P.2d 303 (Utah 1977).
"1 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The constitutional ruling in Stanton did not represent a
dramatic change in the law. In 1973, at the time Stanton was initially presented
in the Utah courts, the Supreme Court had already indicated that sex classifica-
tions would be subjected to meaningful equal protection review. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Further, the
Supreme Court reported in its Stanton opinion that, Utah aside, its investigation
revealed only one other state that retained a sex-based 18/21 age of majority dif-
ferential. 421 U.S. at 15.
"3 440 U.S. 268 (1979); discussed in text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
'3 See 440 U.S. at 288 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed to
Alabama authority holding constitutional attacks on divorce legislation would not
be heard unless presented at the time the divorce is contested.
137 Sovereign immunity is not a bar where the statutory scheme provides
generally for retroactive benefits. Wright v. Califano, 603 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 48 U.S.L.W. __ (1980). Relief might be limited, however, whether the
remedy is against government or a private person, when the ruling on the merits
departs markedly from past precedent or long-established practice and retroactive
19791
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person would pay the toll, notice, reliance and finality interests may
sometimes call for an extension remedy with prospective, but not
retroactive, effect.
V. CONCLUSION
I have tried to discuss intelligibly with you an issue that has attracted
my attention in two capacities: first as an advocate in cases where suc-
cess for a party I supported, Sharron Frontiero or Stephen Wiesenfeld,
for example, turned on the Court's willingness to grant an extension
remedy; then as a law teacher concerned with problems that lack easy
answers. Indicative of the difference in the advocate's and the teacher's
roles, it was far less difficult for me to write a legal brief in support of
extension than it was to pen these remarks.
But at least I have been spared the schizophrenia that sometimes at-
tends practice and teaching activities in the same field. The courts act
legitimately, I am convinced, when they employ common sense and
sound judgment to preserve a law by moderate extension where tearing
it down would be far more destructive of the legislature's will. Yes, ex-
tension does mean "legislat[ing] a bit," '38 in fact, appreciating that the
court is legislating seems to me the key to proper analysis of the
issue.'"" The legislation is, of course, tentative; ultimate authority to
recast or scrap the law in question remains with the political branches.
As Professor Tribe has pointed out, few jurists today subscribe to "a
wooden notion that each branch must 'be limited to the exercise of the
powers appropriate to its own department and no other.""'4 The func-
tion the courts perform in choosing between extension and invalidation
of a constitutionally infirm statute seems to me entirely harmonious
with a view that sees our institutions of government not as rigidly com-
partmentalized but as interdependent.
application could produce substantially inequitable results. See Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf City
of Los Angeles Water & Power Co. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,718-23 (1978) (prospec-
tivity ruling with respect to application of Title VII to ban sex-based pension dif-
ferential).
138 Stanton v. Stanton, 552 P.2d 112, 113 (Utah 1976) (on remand). The Supreme
Court disposition of Stanton is discussed in text accompanying notes 84-86, 132-34
supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 98-103 supra.
110 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (1978) (quoting from Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881)). See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
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